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In the current literature, scal policy is usually characterized by a single-
equation rule, in which primary surplus is generally dened as a function of
lagged government debt and other controlled variables. To apply Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) method on the single-equation rule has been one of the common
approaches to identify scal policy behavior. From the rational expectations
general equilibrium perspective, this paper illustrates that lagged government
debt is generally endogenous and the OLS approach suers from simultane-
ity bias. Consequently, the OLS-based identication of scal policy behavior
is unreliable. As a solution, we apply the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) for estimation and inference. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate
that GMM provides more reliable results than OLS in terms of accuracy of the
estimator, size and power. In short, people should be cautious of the existing
OLS-based identication results of scal policy behavior and the empirical re-
searchers should not consider OLS regression as a reliable tool when trying to
identify scal policy behavior in the future.
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In the current literature, scal policy is usually characterized by a single-equation
rule1, i.e. scal reaction function, just as the monetary policy being characterized
by a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Generally, the scal policy rule denes primary
surplus as a function of lagged government debt and other controlled variables, such
as the output gap or GDP growth. Since the main interest of this paper lies in the
lagged government debt, we suppress the output gap or GDP growth to simplify the
analysis and specify the scal policy rule as the following
~ t = 
0 + 
~ bt 1 + ~  t (1)
where t is real primary surplus, bt 1 is lagged real government debt and  t is scal
policy shock. Variables with \" are measured in logarithm.
In empirical work, applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method on the scal
policy rule similar to (1) has been one of the common approaches to identify scal
policy behavior, such as Bohn (1998) with the U.S. data. For those papers running
policy rule regression, the scal rule is generally treated as a structural equation and
behavioral interpretation is usually attached to the regression results. For instance,
Bohn (1998) interprets the OLS estimator of the coecient of government debt as the
indicator of scal sustainability2.
To guarantee the validity of the results, the papers applying OLS regression on the
scal policy rule always assume, implicitly or not, that the lagged government debt is
exogenous relative to the scal policy shock, which, in terms of (1), implies that ~ bt 1 is
uncorrelated with ~  t. This assumption seems \justiable" at the rst glance because
~ bt 1 is predetermined relative to ~  t. Unfortunately, macroeconomic theory indicates
that ~ bt 1 is generally endogenous in (1) so that ~ bt 1 is correlated with ~  t
3 and the
1There is an extensive literature that species and estimates single-equation scal policy rule, to
name a few, such as Bohn (1998), Gal  and Perotti (2003) and Auerbach (2003).
2For those papers including output gap or GDP growth in the scal policy rule, the coecient
of output gap or GDP growth is usually interpreted as the indicator of scal authority's stance on
economic stabilization.
3For the papers including output gap or GDP growth in the scal policy rule, such as Gal 
and Perotti (2003), instrumental variables (IV) estimation is applied to correct for the endogeneity
2OLS regression is invalid. More specically, according to the rational expectations
hypothesis, the economy is forward-looking in nature and the general equilibrium can
be summarized by a system of simultaneous equations. Based on the system, the
endogeneity of ~ bt 1 relative to ~  t becomes obvious by looking at the intertemporal
government budget constraint (2), which always holds as an equilibrium condition
regardless of the scal policy rule in place
Gov.Debt = Expected Present Value of (Future Surpluses+Future Seigniorage) (2)
That is to say, in equilibrium, not only (1) but also (2) links the government debt to
the future primary surpluses. If the scal policy rule (1) is isolated from the whole
system, important information from other aspects of the economy, especially (2), will
be missing and the policy rule regression will suer from simultaneity bias, which
induces inconsistency in the OLS estimator of 
, i.e. ^ 
OLS
4. As a consequence, ^ 
OLS
is not accurate and even worse, the OLS-based identication of scal policy behavior
is unreliable. This methodological problem has been recognized in the literature for
a long time5. But there has not been much work done to systematically illustrate the
nature and the severity of the problem by closely connecting with the macroeconomic
theory. Our paper tries to shed some light in that direction. Since the problem is best
illustrated in a specic model environment, we adopt a simple Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, which is similar to Leeper (1991) and (2005), as
the data-generating process (DGP).
The rst contribution of this paper is to investigate the simultaneity bias problem
analytically. From the simple analytical example, we illustrate that if an econome-
trician runs OLS regression on (1) using equilibrium data, which is generated by the
underlying DGP, the econometric model (1) is misspecied and ^ 
OLS is inconsistent,
which makes the structural interpretation attached to ^ 
OLS misleading and the iden-
tication of scal policy behavior unreliable. To help understand the nature of the
of the output gap. However, the exogeneity assumption of the lagged government debt is generally
preserved, which means that the problem examined in this paper also matters in that line of research.
4There are a few exceptions where ^ 
OLS is consistent, which will be discussed later in the paper.
5A non-exhaustive list of papers addressing this issue includes Cochrane (1998), Woodford (1998),
(2001) and Davig, Leeper and Chung (2007).
3problem, we provide economic interpretation of the bias. Several results from the
analysis of the illustrative model are worth mentioning. First, with serially correlated
scal policy shock, which is a reasonable assumption consistent with the empirical
evidence, the simultaneity bias problem prevails in the parameter space. For example,
when the monetary and scal policy combination is non-Ricardian6 in the DGP, the
bias can be negative, positive or in some rare cases zero; when the policy combina-
tion is Ricardian in the DGP, the bias is always negative. Second, regardless of the
underlying DGP, OLS estimator of the scal policy rule is inaccurate and the corre-
sponding identication of scal policy behavior is unreliable. Third, monetary and
scal policy interaction matters for the identication of scal policy behavior. For ex-
ample, with a non-Ricardian policy combination in the DGP, as monetary policy pays
less attention to in
ation, ^ 
OLS would be biased up more so that the econometrician
would mistakenly regard the policy combination in the DGP as Ricardian with higher
probability.
The second contribution of the paper is to correct for the simultaneity bias by
applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for estimation and inference,
which provides more reliable results. In order to illustrate the distinct performance of
OLS and GMM, we calibrate the model to the U.S. data and carry out Monte Carlo
experiments. It turns out that over the whole parameter space we are interested in,
GMM performs better than OLS in terms of accuracy of estimator, size and power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we specify and solve the
simple DSGE model. We also derive the state-space representation of the model, which
is used to generate articial data in the Monte Carlo experiments. In section 3, we
derive the analytical form of the simultaneity bias and provide economic interpretation
of the bias. Section 4 species the basic GMM setup. Section 5 reports the results of
the Monte Carlo experiments. Section 6 concludes.
6According to Leeper (1991)'s terminology, monetary policy is passive when interest rate responds
to in
ation less than one-for-one and active when the response is more than one-for-one; loosely
speaking, scal policy is passive when tax responds outstanding government debt strongly and active
otherwise. In the literature of the scal theory of price level, an equilibrium is dened as non-
Ricardian when monetary policy is passive and scal policy is active. On the contrary, when monetary
policy is active and scal policy is passive, the equilibrium is dened as Ricardian.
42 The Illustrative Model
2.1 Model Setup
This is an endowment economy model which is similar to Leeper (1991) and (2005).
In the model, there is an innitely lived representative agent who chooses sequences
fct;Mt;Btg1





t[ln(ct) + ln(Mt=Pt)] (3)









taking the initial liabilities M 1+R 1B 1 > 0 and sequences fy;t;Rt;Ptg1
t=0 as given.
In (3) and (4),  2 (0;1) is the discount factor,  2 (0;1) is the weight on real money
balance in the utility function, ct is the real consumption, Mt is the nominal money
balance, Bt is the nominal one-period government debt with gross nominal interest
rate Rt, Pt the is price level, y is the constant endowment and t is the lump-sum
taxes (if positive) or transfers (if negative).
There is a government with policy sequences fMt;Bt;tg1








where gt is the government spending.
The resource constraint is
ct + gt = y (6)
For simplicity, we assume gt = 0 for all t. So (6) reduces to ct = c = y, which is the
goods market clearing condition.
We obtain the following Fisher and money-demand relations from the standard















where t+1Pt+1=Pt and mtMt=Pt are the in
ation rate and the real money balance,
respectively.
The model is closed by specifying monetary and scal policies, which are character-
ized by simple rules that determine their corresponding policy instruments. Monetary












where bt 1Bt 1=Pt 1 is the real government debt. We assume that the exogenous
monetary and scal policy shocks t and  t have unit means and their logarithms
follow AR(1) processes
ln(t) = 0 + ln(t 1) + "t (11)
ln( t) =  0 +  ln( t 1) + " t (12)
where 0 and  0 are drift terms. jj < 1 and j j < 1 are assumed for stationarity.
The innovations to both policy shocks, "t and " t, are assumed to be independent
and identically-distributed (i.i.d.)7 random variables with zero means and bounded
support. Their standard deviations are  and  , respectively.
7Here we make a strong assumption on "t and " t to separate eects of dierent shocks in a
clear manner, which makes the illustration more transparent. To allow for nonzero cross-correlation
between dierent policy shock innovations, which is more realistic, makes the derivation more cum-
bersome, but would not change the main results of the paper signicantly.
62.2 Model Solution
The general equilibrium of the model is fully characterized by (5), (7)-(12). To solve
the model, we rstly log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic
steady state, as shown in Appendix A. The linearized system is organized in the
standard matrix form
 0Yt+1 =  1Yt + t+1 + 	"t+1 (13)
where Yt+1 =
h





0. Any variable ^ xt denotes log
deviation of xt from its corresponding steady state value x, i.e. ^ xtln(xt) ln(x). We
also dene the one-period-ahead endogenous forecasting error t+1^ t+1   Et^ t+1.









0  1,  =  
 1
0  and 	 =  
 1
0 	. Determinacy of bounded equilibrium8
of the model hinges on the eigenvalues of  
1, which are [; 1   
( 1   1);; ].
According to Leeper (1991) and (2005), we are able to characterize four dierent
regions in the rst quadrant of (;
) space9, two of which indicate determinacy:
(1) When  < 1 and 
 < 1, monetary policy is passive and scal policy is active.
The equilibrium is determinate and non-Ricardian; (2) When  > 1 and 
 > 1,
monetary policy is active and scal policy is passive. The equilibrium is determinate
and Ricardian; (3) When  < 1 and 
 > 1, monetary and scal policies are both
passive and bounded equilibrium is indeterminate; (4) When  > 1 and 
 < 1,
monetary and scal policies are both active and no bounded equilibrium exists. Figure
1 demonstrates these four regions, where determinacy regions are superimposed by red
lines.
In Appendix A, we apply a Jordan decomposition to obtain the analytical solution
of the model. If the bounded equilibrium is determinate, the following conditions that
8In this paper, we are only interested in the determinate equilibrium, which is bounded because
we have assumed that random variables "t and " t have bounded support.
9In fact, it is the absolute values of the eigenvalues that matter for the determinacy. However,
we only focus on the economically interesting regions in the paper, i.e. the rst quadrant of (;
)
space.
7suppress the unstable root of the dynamic system must hold for all t:
P





"t+1 = 0 (16)
where, according to Appendix A, P i is the ith row of P  1 and i is the index denoting
the unstable eigenvalue in . P  1 and , which are dened in Appendix A, are
standard matrices appearing in the Jordan decompostion. In this model context, i = 1
is corresponding to Ricardian equilibrium and 2 is corresponding to non-Ricardian
equilibrium. In both cases, t+1 is uniquely determined by (16). If the bounded
equilibrium is indeterminate, there is no unique mapping between t+1 and "t+1. For
the rest of the paper, we will focus on the determinacy regions. The solution procedure
outlined here will be used later to derive the analytical form of the simultaneity bias
associated with the OLS estimator of the scal policy rule.
2.3 State-Space Representation
The state equation (17), which is also the numerical solution of the model, is obtained
by applying gensys algorithm10, which is based on Sims' (2001).
Yt+1 = G1Yt + M"t+1 (17)
The matrices G1 and M in (17) are outputs from gensys algorithm. Since both the
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where superscript \o" denotes observable variables.
Based on the state-space representation (17) and (18), we are able to simulate
articial data, which is used by the econometrician in the Monte Carlo experiments.
10gensys algorithm can be downloaded from Chris Sims' homepage.
83 OLS Regression: An Analytical Investigation
Now we treat the DSGE model specied in the previous section as the underlying DGP
and suppose an econometrician tries to identify scal policy behavior. We assume
the data the econometrician uses are measured in logarithms, which are denoted by
~ xt  ln(xt) for any variable xt. Because the observable variables are equivalent to the
model variables according to (18), we will suppress the superscript \o" henceforth.
Taking log on both sides of (10), the scal policy rule is in the following form
~ t = 
0 + 
~ bt 1 + ~  t (19)
To simplify the analysis for the time being, we assume that the econometrician knew
the exact form of the scal policy rule (19). From the econometrician's perspective,
~ bt 1 is predetermined relative to ~  t. Therefore, an OLS regression on the structural
equation (19) seems to be \justied". Because of the \validity" of OLS regression, the
econometrician naturally attaches behavioral interpretation to the OLS estimator of

. The econometrician then identies scal policy behavior based on ^ 
OLS. Unfortu-
nately, as will be shown in this section, the OLS regression is not valid, which is not
recognized by the econometrician. The subtlety of the failure of OLS regression lies
in the fact that the econometric model is misspecied, which is due to the isolation of
the scal policy rule from the whole system of structural equations11.





cov(~ bt 1; ~  t)
var(~ bt 1)
(20)
where cov(;) and var() are covariance and variance operators, respectively. It is
clear in (20) that the probability limit of ^ 
OLS contains an additional term besides 
.
Later we will illustrate that the additional term is nonzero everywhere in the parameter
space, with exceptions only in some special cases. As mentioned earlier, when running
OLS regression on (19), the econometrician isolates (19) from the system of structural
11Here we only consider one type of misspecication, i.e. isolation of one structural equation
from the system. In practice, it is possible that the functional form of the scal policy rule is also
misspecied, which will be considered in the future work.
9equations implied by the general equilibrium. So ^ 
OLS is intrinsically subject to si-
multaneity bias, which, asymptotically, is captured by the term cov(~ bt 1; ~  t)=var(~ bt 1)
in (20).
In the next four subsections, we investigate the simultaneity bias through four
cases. DGPs of the rst three cases are characterized by non-Ricardian policy com-
bination and that of the last case is characterized by Ricardian policy combination.
For each case, we provide economic interpretation of the bias, which helps understand
the nature of the problem. To make the economic interpretation straightforward, we
iterate (5) forward over B=P and take expectation conditional on the information set


















where the transversality condition for government debt has been imposed. The in-
tertemporal government budget constraint (21) is a general equilibrium condition that
always holds in equilibrium regardless of the policy combination in place. This condi-
tion tells us that, in equilibrium, real government debt is always equal to the sum of
expected present value of future surpluses and seigniorage revenues.
3.1 Case I (Non-Ricardian):  = 
 =  =   = 0
In this case, nominal interest rate is pegged; primary surplus is exogenous; both the
monetary and the scal policy shocks are serially uncorrelated. The solution is greatly
simplied under these assumptions. First, condition (15) reduces to
~ bt = ln(b) + ('1 + '4)"t (22)
Since ~  t is i.i.d., we have ~  t = " t. Then the covariance term in (20) becomes
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) = cov

ln(b) + ('1 + '4)"t 1;" t

= 0 (23)
where the covariance is 0 because we have assumed " and "  are both i.i.d., which
indicates zero correlation between each other for all leads and lags. Consequently,
10plim^ 
OLS = 
 and the OLS estimator of 
 is free of simultaneity bias, which guarantees
reliable identication of scal policy behavior. However, to assume scal policy shock
being serially uncorrelated is not consistent with the empirical evidence.
3.2 Case II (Non-Ricardian):  = 
 =  = 0;  6= 0
In this case, we keep the assumptions of case I except that scal policy shock ~  t
becomes serially correlated. First, condition (15) reduces to
~ bt = ln(b) + ('1 + '4)~ t +

( 1   1) 
 1    

~  t
= ln(b) + ('1 + '4)"t +

( 1   1) 
 1    

" t
(1    L)
(24)
where we rewrite ~  t as " t=(1    L) by introducing the lag operator. Then the
covariance term in (20) becomes
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) = cov

ln(b) + ('1 + '4)"t +
( 1   1) 
 1    
" t 1
(1    L)
;
" t




( 1   1) 





(1    L)
;
" t
















( 1    )(1   2
 )
> 0 (25)
It is obvious that the covariance is always positive, which implies that the simultaneity
bias is always positive, i.e. plim^ 
OLS > 
. The OLS estimator of 
 is inconsistent.
Even though 
 = 0 by assumption, asymptotically, ^ 
OLS may be signicantly large in
some cases so that the econometrician may mistakenly identify the underlying scal
policy as passive and the equilibrium as Ricardian. In small samples, this also has
negative eect on the econometrician's inference, which will be illustrated in the Monte
Carlo experiments.
To get more economic insight into the positive bias, let us suppose in period t 1,
there is a surprise tax cut, i.e. " t 1 < 0. Since   6= 0 in this case, a tax cut at period
11t   1 projects lower path of future taxes t+i, for i  0. In this endowment economy,
the surprise tax cut has no impact on the expected discount factor in (21). Therefore,
expected future surpluses on the right-hand side (RHS) of (21) get lower, which is
called the expected surplus eect. Besides that, lower expected path of future taxes
makes people feel wealthier, i.e. the wealth eect, which immediately raises demand
for goods. Since the supply of goods is equal to the constant endowment, higher
demand leads to higher in
ation. However, because  = 0, nominal interest rate is
pegged and does not respond to higher in
ation. So expected future in
ation and
seigniorage revenues are not aected. In summary, the RHS of (21) gets lower due to
the expected surplus eect, which makes Bt 1=Pt 1 and ~ bt 1 lower. Because ~  t is on
a lower path, it tends to be lower than before. As a result, ~ bt 1 and ~  t are positively
correlated, which is consistent with the positive covariance in (25).
3.3 Case III (Non-Ricardian): 
 =  = 0; 6= 0;  6= 0
In this case, we keep the assumptions of case II except that the monetary authority
starts to respond to in
ation when setting the nominal interest rate. In general form,
condition (15) is
a21^ t +^ bt + a23^ t + a24 ^  t = 0 (26)
where aij is the ijth entry of P  1. Derivation of cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) and var(~ bt 1) is shown
in Appendix C.
From (53) in Appendix C, it is not obvious to determine the sign of the simultaneity
bias. Instead, we evaluate the bias numerically over a grid in the space of (; ),
where both parameters range from 0:01 to 0:99 with increments of 0:01. We normalize
the economy by setting y = 1. As assumed, 
 and  are both zero. We calibrate
the other parameters to match the U.S. data12. First,  and  are calibrated as 0:99
and 0:001 so that the steady state nominal interest rate and normalized real money
12Since the model implies that output equals consumption, we use personal consumption ex-
penditures as output data, which is from NIPA Table 2.3.5. Data for the nominal interest
rate, the nominal monetary base and the in
ation rate are from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St.Louis, which can be found at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Data for the nom-
inal government debt is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, which can be found at
http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/natdebt.htm.
12balance are 1:01 and 0:1, respectively. Second, 
0 is implicitly calibrated to match the
steady state normalized real government debt 0:8. Finally, at each grid point,  and
  are calibrated to match standard deviations of ^ o
t and ^ bo
t, which are 0:007 and 0:3,
respectively. Here, ^ o
t and ^ bo
t are percentage deviations of observed in
ation and real
government debt from their corresponding long-run averages.
Figure 2 is the plot of the simultaneity bias over the grid, which is calculated based
on the analytical form. Conditional on the calibrated parameter values, the bias can
be either positive or negative, depending on  and  . The bias function is continuous
at zero, which means that   = 0 is only sucient but not necessary for zero bias
in the non-Ricardian case. Obviously, with highly persistent scal policy shocks (e.g.
  > 0:8) and relatively passive monetary policy (e.g.  < 0:5), the bias is mostly
positive and can be very huge. Sometimes, the bias even exceeds 1, the critical value
between active and passive scal policies in our model. In such cases, even though

 = 0 by assumption, the econometrician may mistakenly identify the underlying scal
policy as passive and the equilibrium as Ricardian, which is similar to case II. On the
other hand, by keeping   at high levels and increasing , the sign of the bias may be
reversed, which may also disturb the econometrician's inference.
To get more economic intuition into the bias, let us again suppose in period t 1,
there is a surprise tax cut, i.e. " t 1 < 0. The tax cut at period t   1 lowers the
expected future surpluses on the RHS of (21), which is the expected surplus eect.
Also, lower expected path of future taxes leads to higher in
ation at t   1 through
wealth eect. Since  6= 0, generally  > 0, higher in
ation leads to higher nominal
interest rate through the monetary policy rule. According to the Fisher equation,
higher interest rate raises expected in
ation, which in turn raises expected seigniorage
revenues. We call this the expected seigniorage eect. Since the expected discount
factor is constant, the net eect of a tax cut on the RHS of (21) depends on the tradeo
between the expected surplus eect and the expected seigniorage eect. Consequently,
the correlation between the tax cut and ~ bt 1 is ambiguous. Loosely speaking, given
, higher   implies stronger expected surplus eect, which tends to induce positive
correlation; given  , higher  implies stronger expected seigniorage eect, which
tends to induce negative correlation. As a result, the correlation between ~ bt 1 and ~  t
13can be either positive or negative, which is displayed in Figure 2.
3.4 Case IV (Ricardian)
In this case, monetary policy is active and scal policy is passive. Condition (15)
reduces to









Since the DGP is characterized by Ricardian equilibrium, the second row of system
(51), as shown in Appendix A, is a stable rst-order dierence equation, from which
we can solve for ~ bt as a function of " and " . Eventually, Appendix C shows that
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) =  
 2
 
[1   ( 1   
( 1   1)) ](1   2
 )
(29)
which is always negative unless   = 0. This indicates that serially correlated scal
policy shock is sucient and necessary for negative simultaneity bias in the case of
Ricardian equilibrium. Hence, plim^ 
OLS < 
 and OLS estimator of 
 is inconsistent.
Asymptotically, ^ 
OLS in some cases may be signicantly smaller than 
 so that the
econometrician may mistakenly identify the underlying scal policy as active and the
equilibrium as non-Ricardian. The eect of the negative bias on the econometrician's
inference in small samples will be illustrated in the Monte Carlo experiments.
The economic interpretation underlying the case of Ricardian equilibrium is straight-
forward. We again suppose in period t   1, there is a surprise tax cut, i.e. " t 1 < 0.
From the solution of ~ bt 1, it can be shown that a tax cut at t   1 raises ~ bt 1 im-
mediately. According to the tax rule, higher ~ bt 1 raises lump-sum tax at t, which
neutralizes the eect of a tax cut to the point that in
ation at t 1 keeps unchanged.
This is the standard result of Ricardian equivalence. On the other hand, a tax cut at
t 1 reduces ~  t 1 and tends to reduce ~  t, provided   > 0. So ~ bt 1 and ~  t tend to be
negatively correlated, which is consistent with the negative covariance (29).
143.5 Summary
From the above four cases, it is clear that the simultaneity bias associated with OLS
regression on the scal policy rule prevails no matter what the underlying DGP is.
This could make identication of true scal policy behavior very dicult. With non-
Ricardian equilibrium in the DGP, on one hand, scal policy could be very active,
which implies that 
 could be very small and the link between ~ bt 1 and ~ t through
the scal policy rule could be very weak. On the other hand, correlation between
~ bt 1 and ~ t through the equilibrium condition (21) could be very strong. When the
econometrician runs OLS regression on the scal policy rule using equilibrium data, it
is very possible that ^ 
OLS is signicantly large. With Ricardian equilibrium in place,
both scal policy rule and (21) imply relatively strong correlation between ~ bt 1 and
~ t. So ^ 
OLS mixes the correlation information from both channels, which obscures the
true scal policy behavior.
4 GMM: Basic Setup
To overcome the pitfall of OLS regression on the scal policy rule, we apply the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)13 for estimation and inference.
As assumed earlier, innovation to the scal policy shock, " t, is an i.i.d. random
variable with zero mean, which implies the following moment condition
E[" tjIt 1] = 0 (30)
where E[jIt 1] is the conditional expectation operator with information up to period
t   1. Rearranging (12) using the lag operator, we get
(1    L) ~  t =  0 + " t (31)
Pre-multiplying (19) on both sides by (1    L), we get
(1    L)~ t = (1    L)
0 + 
(1    L)~ bt 1 +  0 + " t (32)
13Hamilton (1994) provides a nice description of the basic GMM procedure. Canova (2007) and
Ruge-Murcia (2007), among others, have more specic discussion of GMM in the context of estimating
DSGE models.
15where (31) has been applied. With (32), condition (30) can be written as
E[   ~ t +  ~ t 1 + 
~ bt 1   
 ~ bt 2jIt 1] = 0 (33)
where   (1  )
0 + 0. Moment condition (33) basically says " t is orthogonal to
the information set It 1. By choosing a set of instrumental variables from It 1, say zt,
we are able to set up a series of moment conditions, based on which GMM estimation
can be applied. More specically, the set of population moment conditions looks like
E[(   ~ t +  ~ t 1 + 
~ bt 1   
 ~ bt 2) 
 zt] = 0 (34)
where zt is the (r  1) vector of instrumental variables and 
 denotes kronecker
product. Totally we have three parameters to estimate, i.e.   [
; ;]. Since
the moment conditions (34) are nonlinear in the parameters, the GMM specication
needs to be over-identied (r > 3) to pin down 
, which is the parameter to our central
interest.
To implement GMM estimation, we derive the following sample moments which






(   ~ t +  ~ t 1 + 
~ bt 1   
 ~ bt 2) 
 zt (35)





where W() is the weighting matrix. The solution of (36) is the GMM estimator of
, i.e. ^ GMM. The asymptotic properties of ^ GMM have been well developed, based
on which statistical inference on the scal policy behavior can be drawn.
5 Monte Carlo Experiments
In this section, we calibrate the model to the U.S. data and carry out a series of
Monte Carlo experiments to illustrate the distinct small-sample performance of OLS
and GMM in identifying scal policy behavior.
16In the experiment, we arbitrarily choose zt = [1;~ bt 1; ~ t 1;~ bt 2; ~ t 2]0 and carry
out two-step GMM. The weighting matrix in the rst step is identity matrix and the
construction of the optimal weighting matrix in the second step follows Newey and
West (1987). The implementation is based on the GMM and optimization program
libraries in MATLAB written by Cli14.
5.1 Basic Setup
First, in the region of [;
] space that is corresponding to the non-Ricardian equilib-
rium, we set up a grid where both parameters range from 0:01 to 0:99 with increments
of 0:01. Symmetrically, in the region that is corresponding to the Ricardian equilib-
rium, we set up a grid ranging from 1:01 to 1:99 with increments of 0:01. For both
regions, we calibrate [y;;;
0;; ] in the same way as case III of section 3. We
choose moderate values for  and  , which are 0:75 and 0:9, respectively.
Before going into the Monte Carlo experiments, we calculate the simultaneity bias
for both regions according to the formula derived in Appendix C, which is displayed
in Figure 3 and 4. In Figure 3, which is for non-Ricardian region, it is noticeable
that the bias is positive when  is smaller than 0:3 and turns to negative as  gets
larger. Besides, the negative bias is nonlinear in , which is indicated by the U-shaped
plane. This is because when  is very small, the expected surplus eect dominates the
expected seigniorage eect, which implies positive correlation between ~ bt 1 and ~  t and
thus positive bias. In these cases, monetary policy is very passive and the nominal
interest rate is nearly pegged. So the volatility of expected in
ation and seigniorage
is relatively small compared to the cases when  is large. From (21), we know that
the volatility of ~ bt 1 should be relatively small, which makes the simultaneity bias
relatively large in magnitude. As  gets larger, the expected seigniorage eect starts
to dominate, which turns the correlation between ~ bt 1 and ~  t to negative. However,
the expected seigniorage eect is not linear in . In fact, there is an underlying Laer
curve explaining the nonlinearity. As the economy gets to the downward-sloping
side of the Laer curve, higher  induces weaker seigniorage eect, which makes the
14The MATLAB code is located at http://mcli.cob.vt.edu/ with documentation Cli (2003).
17expected surplus eect relatively stronger and drives the bias up back to zero after a
certain point. In gure 4, which is for Ricardian region, the bias is always negative
and turns out to be a downward-sloping plane in 
. This is because as 
 gets larger,
taxes respond to government debt more strongly. This makes the expected seigniorage
less volatile because the wealth eect is weaker. Through (21), var(~ bt 1) gets smaller,
which makes the bias larger in magnitude.
5.2 Experiment 1
The rst experiment is to explore the accuracy of the estimator of 
 from both OLS
and GMM estimation. Specically, for each combination of  and 
 in each region,
we simulate 1000 independent data sets according to (17) and (18), each with 300
quarters. Based on each data set, the econometrician runs OLS regression on (19)
and then implements GMM procedure (36). With each estimator, the econometrician
tests the following hypotheses
H0 : 
 = 




0 is the true value of 
 at that grid point. The nominal size of the test is 5%.
Since the econometrician is always under the null hypothesis, we nally calculate the
empirical size at each grid point based on the 1000 repetitions.
Because of the computational cost, we dene a more sparse grid for each region.
Specically, in the non-Ricardian case, both parameters range from 0:1 to 0:9 with
increments of 0:1; in the Ricardian case, both parameters range from 1:1 to 1:9 with
increments of 0:1. The results are organized in Table 1 and 2, where Table 1 displays
the empirical size of both methods in the non-Ricardian region and Table 2 is for the
Ricardian region. In each table, rows are for 
 and columns are for . The empirical
size before \=" in each entry is based on OLS regression and that after \=" is based
on GMM.
In Table 1, it is obvious that OLS regression has severe size distortion over the
whole region, especially when either  or 
 increases. Generally speaking, the size
distortion of the OLS approach is due to the fact that the OLS estimator is inconsis-
18tent, which results in the poor accuracy of ^ 
OLS. In contrast, ^ 
GMM is consistent and
the empirical size of GMM is around the nominal size over the whole region.
Table 2 shows the same pattern as in Table 1. One thing to note is that in Table
2, GMM has relatively high empirical size when 
 gets closer to the boundary value.
With other experiments, we nd that, when 
 is relatively small, the empirical size of
GMM approaches to the nominal size as T increases. This happens maybe because in
small samples: (1) information is not enough to pin down the parameter accurately;
(2) the asymptotic standard error of ^ 
GMM understates the true volatility of ^ 
GMM,
which induces poor statistical inference. Even so, we still get strong evidence that
GMM performs uniformly better than OLS regression in terms of accuracy of the
estimator.
5.3 Experiment 2
The second experiment is a scenario where the econometrician tries to identify scal
policy behavior with both OLS and GMM methods. The basic setup is the same as
in experiment 1 except that now the econometrician tests the following hypotheses
H0 : 
  1 H1 : 
 < 1 (38)
where the null and the alternative hypotheses are corresponding to passive and active
scal policy, respectively. In the non-Ricardian region, the econometrician is under
the alternative and we calculate the empirical power. While in the Ricardian region,
the econometrician is under the null and we calculate the empirical size.
We use the same grid as in experiment 1. The results are organized in Table 3 and
4, where Table 3 displays the empirical power of both methods in the non-Ricardian
region and Table 4 displays the empirical size of both methods in the Ricardian region.
The empirical power=size before \=" in each entry is based on OLS regression and that
after \=" is based on GMM.
In Table 3, it is clear that OLS regression has low power as  gets small, e.g.
 < 0:3, which is because in these cases, ^ 
OLS is biased up signicantly. When  is
relatively small, the power of OLS regression gets even lower as 
 gets larger. For
instance, OLS regression has zero power when  < 0:2 and 
 > 0:7. On the other
19hand, OLS regression has power equal to 1 as  gets large, e.g.  > 0:5. This comes
from the fact that ^ 
OLS is downward biased when  is at relatively high levels. This
pattern indicates that how monetary policy behaves has impact on the reliability of the
OLS-based identication results, which is an important implication on the empirical
work that applies OLS regression on the identication of scal policy behavior. If
monetary policy is very passive, such as interest rate pegging (  0), OLS regression
has a very hard time to recover an active scal policy. So a world consistent with
the scal theory of price level is dicult to be identied in practice. Considering the
literature trying to identify scal policy behavior or testing scal sustainability using
OLS regression, such as Bohn (1998), most papers get results favoring passive scal
policy. By connecting with our analysis, it might be the case that the scal policy in
place is actually active, which is just not identiable by OLS approach. For GMM,
there is an overall power improvement compared to OLS regression. Since ^ 
GMM is
consistent, there is no abnormal pattern in its power performance. Generally speaking,
GMM has uniformly high power when 
 is small, which is useful to identify a world
of the scal theory of price level. The power of GMM decreases as 
 gets closer to the
boundary value, which is a small-sample problem. According to some complementary
experiments, this could be remedied to some extent with larger sample size.
In Table 4, the size performance of OLS and GMM is in sharp contrast. Since ^ 
OLS
is inconsistent, OLS regression has size distortion, especially when 
 is relatively small.
In these cases, ^ 
OLS is biased downwards. Because the asymptotic standard error is
also biased downwards in small samples, passive scal policy near the boundary is
hard to be identied by OLS regression. For GMM, the empirical size is zero for most
cases except for the experiments near the boundary, where the empirical size is slightly
greater than zero but smaller than the nominal size.
Overall, GMM outperforms the OLS regression over the whole parameter space in
terms of size and power. Therefore, we expect more reliable identication results from
GMM.
206 Conclusion
If scal policy is specied as a single-equation rule, in which primary surplus is de-
ned as a function of lagged government debt and other controlled variables, how can
we identify scal authority's behavior in a reliable way? We focus our interest on
the coecient of lagged government debt and try to nd the answer by starting from
OLS regression on the scal policy rule, one of the common approaches applied in
the current literature. From the rational expectations general equilibrium perspec-
tive, we illustrates that lagged government debt is generally endogenous and the OLS
approach is invalid because of the simultaneity bias. Consequently, the OLS-based
identication of scal policy behavior is unreliable. To correct for the simultaneity
bias associated with the OLS approach, we nd a series of moment conditions from
the model and propose GMM estimation, which provides consistent estimator and
reliable inference. Monte Carlo experiments compare OLS with GMM in terms of ac-
curacy of the estimator, size and power, which turn out to support our proposal. As a
general suggestion, people should be cautious of the existing OLS-based identication
results of scal policy behavior and the empirical researchers should not consider OLS
regression as a reliable tool when trying to identify scal policy behavior in the future.
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate the existing methodological problem
in a clear way and try to connect the econometric failure with macroeconomic theory
more closely, which is best done in a specic model environment. Even though the
results are based on the model setup and calibrated parameter values, the simultaneity
bias problem examined here is general and robust to model specication and parameter
values. As long as a scal policy rule, a basic component of the underlying general
equilibrium structure, is specied and estimated by OLS regression, the results tend
to be misleading.
In the future work, there are several issues we need to address. First, we want to
see if the GMM-based identication is robust to the potential misspecication in the
functional form of the scal policy rule. Second, we also want to see if the GMM-based
identication is robust to the potential misspecication in the policy shock process.
Third, we need to formally study the choice of instrumental variables, while in this
21paper we choose them in an arbitrary manner. As is well known, this matters for the
parameter identication. Fourth, we would like to see if the bootstrap method is able
to correct for the small-sample bias in the GMM standard error and provide better
inference.
22Appendix A: Solution of the Model
To solve the model, we rst log-linearize (7) and (9) as
^ Rt = Et^ t+1 (39)
^ Rt = ^ t + ^ t (40)
To get (39), we have imposed steady state condition R =  1. For simplicity, we
assume  = 1. Combining (39) and (40), we get
Et^ t+1 = ^ t + ^ t (41)
We then dene the one-period-ahead endogenous forecasting error t+1^ t+1 Et^ t+1
and express (41) as
^ t+1 = ^ t + ^ t + t+1 (42)
Next, we log-linearize (5), (8) and (10) as
m^ mt + b^ bt + ^ t = m^ mt 1   m^ t + Rb ^ Rt 1 + Rb^ bt 1   Rb^ t (43)
m(R   1)^ mt = R(c   m) ^ Rt (44)
^ t = 
^ bt 1 + ^  t (45)
where relevant steady state conditions have been imposed. Combining (40), (43)-(45)
and rearranging terms, we get






^ bt 1 + '3^ t + (























23and   1=(1 R) is the interest elasticity of money demand. It is straightforward to
log-linearize (11) and (12) as
^ t = ^ t 1 + "t (47)
^  t =   ^  t 1 + " t (48)
After substituting (47) and (48) into (46), we get







 1 1)  ^  t '3"t+1 (
 1 1)" t+1
(49)
So far, (42), (47)-(49) form a self-contained system governing the dynamics of ^ t,
^ bt, ^ t and ^  t. We organize the linearized system in the following matrix form
 0Yt+1 =  1Yt + t+1 + 	"t+1 (50)
where Yt+1 =
h










1 0 0 0
'1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0




























 0 1 0
 '2  1   
( 1   1)  ('3 + '4)  ( 1   1) 
0 0  0













0  1,  =  
 1
0  and 	 =  
 1
0 	. Applying a Jordan decomposition on
 












24where  is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues of  






 0 0 0
0  1   
( 1   1) 0 0
0 0  0




P is a matrix, each column of which is the eigenvector of  
1 and is corresponding to
the eigenvalue in . Since there are no repeated eigenvalues, P has full column rank






















0 0 1 0















( 1 1) . If the bounded equi-
librium is determinate, the following conditions suppress the unstable root of the








where P i is the ith row of P  1 and i is the index denoting the unstable eigenvalue in
.
Appendix B: Derivation of (20)
For readers' convenience, let us rewrite (19) as below.
~ t = 
0 + 
~ bt 1 + ~  t
Stacking all observations in vectors, we get
~  = 1
0 + 
~ b 1 + ~  
= ~ X  + ~   (52)
25where ~  = [~ 2;:::; ~ T]0, ~ b 1 = [~ b1;:::;~ bT 1]0, ~   = [ ~  2;:::; ~  T]0, ~ X = [1;~ b 1],   =
[
0;









= ( ~ X
0 ~ X)
 1( ~ X
0~ ) =   + ( ~ X
0 ~ X)
 1( ~ X
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E(~ bt 1 ~  t)   E(~ bt 1)E( ~  t)
E(~ b2
t 1)   (E(~ bt 1))2 = 
 +
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t)
var(~ bt 1)
where E() is the expectation operator.
Appendix C: Derivation of Simultaneity Bias
 Case III (Non-Ricardian): 
 =  = 0; 6= 0;  6= 0





















































26Since A1 6= 0, we have
~ bt = ln(b) +
A3 + A5L
(A1 + A2L)(1   L)
"t +
A4 + A6L






























where Ci = Ai=A1, for i = 2;3;4;5;6.



















  + C2
; n1 =  
C3 + C5
 + C2
; n2 =  
C4  + C6
  + C2
So we have
~ bt 1 = ln(b) + B1"t 1 + B2" t 1









 )" t 3   
Since
~  t =
" t
1    L
= " t +  " t 1 + 
2
 " t 2 + 
We can show that
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) = (m2   n2) 
2












    
= [(m2    m2C2
2




    )   (n2  + n2
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  + n2
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27where the last equality holds because in non-Ricardian equilibrium, C2 =   >
 1 and jC2 j < 1.
Finally, we can show that
var(~ bt 1) = cov(~ bt 1;~ bt 1)
= [(m1   n1)














































1 + C2 
(54)
 Case IV (Ricardian):
Recall (27) and (28),








Let us dene g   1=( ) and  =  1  
( 1  1). Since the equilibrium
is Ricardian, the second row of system (51) is a stable rst-order dierence
equation, from which we can solve for ~ bt as a function of " and " :
~ bt = ln(b) +
D3 + D5L
(D1 + D2L)(1   L)
"t +
D4 + D6L












D3 =  (a21g + a23)
D4 =  a24









g   '3 + a23
D8 =  (
 1   1)  
( 1   1) 
    
It can be shown that
D3 + D5L







= m1 + m1L + 
2m1L
2 + 











1    L
= m2 + m2L + 
2m2L
2 + 















D6 +  D4









= D8 + D8L + 
2D8L
2 + 
29With some algebra, we can show
cov(~ bt 1; ~  t) =  
 2
 

































Obviously, the simultaneity bias in the case of Ricardian equilibrium is always
negative unless   = 0.
30Figure 1: First Quadrant of (;
) Space
Figure 2: Simultaneity Bias in the Numerical Example (Case III)
31Figure 3: Simultaneity Bias (Non-Ricardian)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[1] Auerbach, A.J. (2003): \Fiscal Policy, Past and Present." Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 2003:1, 75-138.
[2] Bohn, H. (1998): \The Behavior of U.S. Public Debt and Decits." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(3), 869-902.
[3] Canova, F. (2007): \Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research." Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[4] Cli, M.T. (2003): \GMM and MINZ Program Libraries for MATLAB."
Manuscript, Purdue University.
[5] Cochrane, J.H. (1998): \A Frictionless View of U.S. In
ation." NBER Macroe-
conomics Annual, 13, 323-384.
[6] Davig, T., Leeper, E.M. and Chung, H. (2007): \Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Switching." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39(4), 809-842.
[7] Gal , J. and Perotti, R. (2003): \Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Eu-
rope." Economic Policy, 18(37), 533-572.
[8] Hamilton, J.D. (1994): \Time Series Analysis." Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
[9] Leeper, E.M. (1991): \Equilibria Under `Active' and `Passive' Monetary and
Fiscal Policies." Journal of Monetary Economics, 27(1), 129-147.
[10] ||| (2005): \Macro Policy and In
ation: An Overview." Manuscript.
[11] Newey, W. and West, K. (1987): \A Simple Positive Semi-Denite, Heteroskedas-
ticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix." Econometrica, 55,
703-708.
37[12] Ruge-Murcia, F.J. (2007): \Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium Models." Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 31(8), 2599-
2636.
[13] Sims, C.A. (2001): \Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models." Journal of
Computational Economics, 20(1-2), 1-20.
[14] Woodford, M. (1998): \Comment on John Cochrane, `A Frictionless View of U.S.
In
ation.'" NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 13, 390-418.
[15] ||| (2001): \Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability." Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 33(3), 669-728.
38